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The strategy that had been followed since August
1982, when the debt crisis began, focused ort new
money as the cornerstone of the financial packages
that commercial banks assembled for various
restructuring countries. The emphasis was on burden-
sharing and cooperation among the various parties -
creditor and debtor governments, the international
financial institutions, and commercial banks.
The common goal was to provide the countries with
both the time and resources - by postponing debt
repayments and encouraging new money - while they
made necessary economic reforms. These reforms, in
time, would allow the countries to return to the
voluntary capital markets, where they could again
raise the incremental funds that they will need, as
developing countries, for their future growth.
New-money exercises, which encouraged large
numbers of creditor banks to continue lending to the
countries, clearly were consistent with that goal.
Voluntary debt-reduction programmes were intro-
duced in 1984 and they grew in importance. Tn 1988,
for the first time since the debt crisis began, the
countries of Latin America, as a group, managed to
reduce their external debt.
An indebted country gains from debt reduction to the
extent that it reduces its total debt at a discount to face
value. However, the country takes the longer-term risk
of limiting its future financing. Banks that have taken
losses on loans to a borrower are less likely to lend
again to the same borrower.
Progress was made under this new-money-oriented
strategy with support from commercial banks and
other creditors, many of the restructuring countries
started reforming, privatising and opening their
economies. Chile, Uruguay, Mexico and the
Philippines, all of which have returned to growth, are
cases where the right economic policies are working.
As an example, during the second half of the l980s,
growth averaged 6.6 per cent a year in Chile and
4.9 per cent in Colombia, while in Mexico it has now
reached 3 per cent. There have also been a few,
though small, voluntary market transactions, by
Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela.
Some of the countries, however, have so far failed to
make meaningful economic reforms, and progress
overall has been slower than many of us had hoped.
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Last March, US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady
proposed that voluntary debt reduction by the
commercial banks replace new money as the
centrepiece of a changed strategy. He also made the
point, largely overlooked since, that some continuing
flows of new money must remain an essential part of
that strategy.
In response to the Brady proposals, the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank agreed to offer
certain resources to back debt-reduction programmes
for countries that have viable economic programmes.
Commercial banks have negotiated preliminary
agreements on three packages under the revised
strategy - with Mexico, the Philippines and Costa
Rica. Earlier this month, at the invitation of Mexico's
president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, creditor banks
started signing the first of the three packages at a
ceremony in Mexico City. Negotiations are underway
with several other countries, the most prominent of
which is Venezuela.
The Mexican package - the most complex and
innovative ever assembled in the international
markets - is the first during the debt crisis to
emphasise voluntary debt reduction more than new
money. Yet it combines the two in a way that, the
government of Mexico believes, will allow the country
to put the debt crisis behind it, create a base for
investment and enter a period of sustained economic
growth. Given continued progress with the govern-
ment's economic-reform programme, T think Mexico
can accomplish this. At a recent meeting in Mexico
City, President Salinas reiterated his commitment to
open the economy, privatise, deregulate and maintain
order in public finances by reducing the deficit as a
percentage of GDP.
The response from the international banking
community has been unprecedented for any package
of this magnitude. Virtually all of Mexico's
approximately 460 creditor banks will have signed, by
the time we close the books, and issue the debt-
reduction bonds, toward the end of April, 1990. Tn fact
there may be no free-riders.
The agreement covers all of Mexico's $48.5 bn in
medium- and long-term debt to commercial banks.
Banks representing 41 per cent of the debt chose to
reduce principal, at a discount of 35 per cent; and
49 per cent chose to reduce debt service by limiting
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interest payments to a fixed 6'/4 per cent; and the
remainder, or lOper cent, chose to lend new money. If
the foreign offices of Mexican banks are included in
the figures, new money is approximately 13 per cent of
the total.
When we announced the agreement in principle last
July, it was criticised for containing too little debt
reduction, not enough discount and too much new
money. However, the debt-reduction instruments
account for about 90 per cent of the agreement, and
debt-principal reduction is twice as much as initially
forecast.
Even more important, the package is a demonstration
of confidence in Mexico, and recognition of its historic
economic reform programme, by its various creditors
- governments, the multilateral organisations and
commercial banks.
This demonstration of support should help the
country further reduce the cost of servicing its very
large internal debt and attract new investment from
domestic and foreign sources. Since our negotiations
began last spring, internal interest rates within Mexico
have dropped, flight capital has been returning and
there have been increased signs of new investment
inflows. Economic growth reached three per cent in
1989, the highest since 1982, and Mexico's reserves
have risen to more than $7.2 bn. lt all comes down to
regaining confidence.
I was first quoted in July 1989 saying that the Mexican
agreement is no cookie-cutter. The package for
Mexico is responsive to circumstances in Mexico,
which differ from circumstances in other countries.
For example, compared to the three basic options in
the Mexican agreement, the Philippines agreement has
just two options - a debt buy-back and new money -
while the Costa Rican agreement has no new-money
option. Some other countries may need only one debt-
reduction choice. Some will need new money, others
will not.
Given the different circumstances of each country, I
expect that the case-by-case, or country-by-country
approach, which has been followed since the crisis
began, will continue.
As we look ahead, however, I have several major
concerns over the changed strategy, all of them closely
related.
One is the fact that the resources made available by the
public sector to support debt reduction are proving
insufficient to meet the expectations of various
borrowing countries and, generally, to resolve the debt
problem.
In this respect, it would be helpful if other surplus
industrialised countries would follow the leadership of
Japan and establish recycling programmes. Through
the Paris Club, the industrialised countries could also
help Latin America by lengthening restructurings and
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grace periods and lowering interest payments, much as
the commercial banks have been doing.
In addition, government export-development agencies
should restore their lines of credit more rapidly to
countries making progress in economic reform.
I have several specific recommendations that I hope
the interim committee will consider when it next meets
to review the changed debt strategy:
First, the multilateral institutions could further help
the restructuring countries by allowing them more
flexibility with the resources that currently must be
allocated specifically to each type of debt reduction,
whether a cash buy-back or instruments to reduce debt
principal or debt service. The fungibility, or as I refer
to it, co-mingling of these resources would enable each
country to use the funds to its maximum benefit, for
the debt-reduction techniques most appropriate to its
particular needs.
Second, Colombia should be a leading candidate to
benefit from the World Bank's new Expanded Co-
Financing Operation (ECO) for countries that have
not restructured their debt. At the same time, the
World Bank should consider extending that pro-
gramme to countries that are successfully coming out
of the restructuring process, have met their obligations
and are following viable economic programmes.
Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and the Philippines come to
mind.
Third, one of the lessons we learned from the Mexican
package is the importance of up-front enhancements.
The international financial institutions could help the
indebted countries speed their negotiations with
commercial banks by being more flexible in up-
fronting enhancements for debt reduction. A group of
commercial banks recently completed a $l.2bn
bridging to the enhancements for Mexico only with
great difficulty and after long negotiations.
Fourth, the World Bank could facilitate the countries'
negotiations with their commercial banks by being
more forthcoming in granting waivers to its negative-
pledge clause. This would permit a greater variety of
financing techniques specifically designed to the
countries' needs.
Another concern is the overly-strong emphasis being
placed, in practice, on voluntary debt reduction over
continuing flows of new money. In the three packages
negotiated under the changed strategy, all the public-
sector enhancements are devoted to encouraging debt
reduction; new money is underemphasised or ignored
completely.
Many banks feel that this signal, and others that they
have been receiving from some public officials, stress
debt reduction only, not new money, and they are
responding accordingly. Both Mexico and the
Philippines needed incremental new money from
commercial banks to help finance the debt-reduction
options in their packages. Yet both countries have had
difficulty raising new money. Other countries.
including some less successful at economic reform,
could face a similar problem in future negotiations.
Of more fundamental concern, many countries in
Latin America will continue to need some new
commercial-bank funding over the longer term, as
they have in the past, to complement their own
savings, foreign investment inflows and funds from
official sources.
Yet debt-reduction programmes - particularly those
involving debt-principal reduction - basically
encourage banks to end their lending relationships
with the participating countries. It is appropriate that
some banks, consistent with their business strategies,
choose to go this route. It is also appropriate that such
banks do so through burden-sharing, by voluntarily
taking losses through debt-reduction programmes.
These programmes, unlike discounted sales to third
parties in the secondary market, pass on the benefits of
those losses to the countries themselves.
At the same time, there is a core group of international
lenders, my own institution included, that have a
commitment to the future of Latin America. These
banks would be willing, under the right circumstances,
to continue to support, with new money where needed,
those countries that are making serious efforts to
reform their economies.
Consequently, commercial-bank financing packages
should be designed not only to provide exit
instruments for banks wishing to leave, but also to
encourage a core group of banks to continue lending
to the developing world. If this does not happen. many
developing countries will have to rely exclusively on
their own internal savings and capital flows from
official sources. Recent history suggests that this
dependence could severely limit the growth of Latin
America and the rest of the developing world.
Specifically, I support a more balanced financing
approach for future commercial-bank packages -
one that, in addition to voluntary debt reduction,
recognises the importance of continuing new-money
flows. New-money options that have proved successful
in earlier packages include: trade-finance facilities,
on-lending, project financings, new-money bonds,
debt-equity conversions and co-financings with the
World Bank, and perhaps, with regional development
banks, such as the 1DB.
With the exception of co-financings, all of these
options are negotiated solely between the restructuring
country and its creditor banks. Unlike enhancements
for debt reduction, they do not involve any public
funds.
I am further concerned over significant increases in
arrearages in interest payments to commercial banks
by a number of countries, since the adoption of the
current strategy. In some cases, this development may
reflect a perception by those countries that the current
strategy condones their use of arrearages as a form of
external financing. The international financial
institutions, for example, in some cases have broken
with previous policy and disbursed funds to countries
that are in arrears to commercial-bank creditors. The
international financial institutions are beginning to
see, however, that arrearages to commercial banks can
also stimulate arrearages to them.
The arrearage problem, if not addressed satisfactorily,
will have important ramifications for both creditor
banks and indebted countries. Last year many
creditors increased their loan-loss reserves, significantly
reducing earnings. Some of them cited mounting
arrearages as a major reason.
Of the three countries that have negotiated debt-
reduction agreements under the changed strategy,
Mexico and the Philippines were fully current on
interest, and Costa Rica, though in arrears, was
making regular partial payments. The Costa Ricans
agreed, as part of their commercial-bank package, to
clear arrearages through a 20 per cent downpayment,
a repayment schedule without grace period and a
rolling three-year interest guarantee on past-due
interest. This part of the agreement with Costa Rica
demonstrates the importance that banks place on
resolving pending interest-arrearage problems.
Continuing arrearages will make it increasingly
difficult to complete future commercial-bank financing
packages for the countries in question and therefore
will retard their programmes of economic growth and
reform.
The combination of voluntary debt reduction and
some new money, where needed, is therefore the most
promising way out of the debt crisis. This formula can
be successful only if accompanied by demonstrated
progress by the countries, in reforming and opening
their economies and encouraging local savings and
direct investment.
Given the problems and uncertainties that I have
outlined, I believe that the current strategy has
positioned the debt crisis at a turning point.
If not managed carefully, the strategy could
undermine the progress to date, and leave future
financing for much of Latin America entirely to
governmental sources. If managed carefully, however,
with a renewed emphasis on cooperation among all
parties it could alleviate the situation and set the stage
for the eventual return of some of the restructuring
countries to the private capital markets.
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